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1. Introduction
    This paper is intended to demonstrate the existence of a 
wartime register and characterize its major stylistic and rhetorical 
peculiarities. The main area of research chosen is the wartime 
discourse of Japanese newspapers written in English during the 
Second World War. The secondary area chosen for the purpose of 
demonstrating the universal elements of a wartime register is media 
discourse in the U.S. concerning the "war on terrorism" that was 
initiated in the aftermath of the September 11th attacks on New York 
and Washington.
    The reality manifested in wartime newspaper reports, 
especially in undemocratic states, can merely be a representation of 
reality because of the highly ideological dimensions involved in 
creating the texts. The language of wartime news reports is 
understood when it is analyzed comprehensively in the light of 
power relations and a sociological study of political language, its 
style, and its register. My approach to language analysis here is 
therefore sociolinguistic. As Halliday says, a language system 
incorporates cultural, societal, and situational factors, and does not 
exist on its own (Halliday 1978). On the basis of these ideas, this 
study examines how linguistic resources are used to systematize,
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transform, and sometimes even mask reality. The operation of a 
wartime register is to categorize and label people, events, and goals 
so as to regulate and even control the ideas and behavior of people. 
Language usage does not simply encode systems of social 
organization, processes, and power differences; it also can be 
instrumental in enforcing them (Sauer 1988: 83). Wartime is a 
period when the most extreme pattern of control through language is 
practiced in order to mobilize people towards the goal of victory. In 
order to achieve a national goal (in this case, to wage a war), a strong 
form of solidarity and a control of the entire nation on the basis of 
consensus are essential. Such a national goal is not, however, always 
simple and sound enough to persuade and mobilize a whole 
population without provoking doubt. Often (as was especially the 
case up to about fifty years ago) the enemy is invisible and unfamiliar 
to the ordinary people. It is through media and its language that the 
image of the enemy is painted and presented to us. Leaders have to 
manipulate information to serve their purpose and to justify their 
cause. One of the important ools for achieving the above purposes, 
language plays a significant role: in categorizing, labeling, 
dichotomizing (us versus them), impersonalizing, collectivizing, 
abstracting, idealizing death, and commanding through directive 
speech acts or strong modalizers, etc. to obscure or exaggerate truth. 
These linguistic devices are implicitly used as an instrument for 
mobilizing and exerting control.
    Nevertheless, a wartime register is not just a product of some 
distant past when an all-out war was being conducted. It has 
universality and is present in the modern world. Regardless of time, 
it emerges whenever any society moves onto a war footing and 
needs mobilization of the whole population. Following the 
September 11th terrorist attacks on New York and Washington D.C., 
the U.S. entered a state of emergency and began a "war against 
terror" (e.g., through bombing attacks on Afghanistan), at the same
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time proclaiming a possible attack on Iraq.Although the nature of 
war has changed and has become more complex in the last six 
decades, the necessity of a wartime register emains the same when a 
nation is in danger and needs to mobilize the support of general 
public opinion. 
    For these reasons, I shall consider how control is enforced 
through some form of language usage that  differs from the ordinary 
rules and directives by which interpersonal control is obviously 
managed. Although discourse in the press manages without 
directive speech acts or explicit command structures, it is clearly 
intended to be an instrument aimed at affecting and controlling the 
behavior of people. 
2. Categorizing, Labeling, and Thought Control 
    Categorizing is the basis for all scientific activities and an 
instrument necessary for influencing people's perceptions. Fowler 
says that, 
    if we imagined the world as a vast collection of individual 
    things and people, we would be overwhelmed by details and 
    chaos. We manage the world, make sense of it, transform 
    chaos into a cohesive order by categorizing objects,people and 
    other phenomena (Fowler 1991: 58, 92). 
    Categorizing can be dangerous when it is used as a political 
tool to manipulate public opinion. Indeed, the world presented by 
the press is a culturally and socially organized set of categories, based 
on the subjective views of reporters and editors, rather than a mere 
objective collection of unique individuals and events. Categorizing 
can seldom be value-free. What is more, "classification is likely to be 
of service to the position in power structure represented or favored
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by the newspaper" (Fowler 1981: 29). By classifying phenomena, 
and giving names to them, that is, by labeling, unobservable or even 
nonexistent objects or people can be created to serve the purpose of 
people in power. Fowler explains why categorization can be 
deceptive and ideologically manipulative, in the following terms:
In so far as we regard the category of person as displaying 
strongly predictable attributes or behaviour, the category may 
harden into a stereotype, an extremely simplified mental 
model which fails to see individual features, only the values 
that are believed to be appropriate to the type. This is, of 
course, a basic ideological process at work... [E]ssentially the 
things we see and think about are constructed according to a 
scheme of values, not entities directly perceived. (Fowler 1991: 92)
    The single equation "X is Y" can involve elements of 
overgeneralization, overstatement, and sometimes even deception by 
presenting one's idea as if it is real (Bolinger 1980: 88). Indeed, the 
name for a category rebuilds the unique elements of certain people, 
of particular social problems, and of certain policies into prominent 
stereotypes (Edelman 1977: 40). The existence of such stereotypes i
thus maintained and reinforced by repetitious usage, until such 
repetition induces a paralyzing effect among people. 
    As Halliday (1978) points out, categorization by vocabulary is 
a major part of the reproduction of ideology in the press, and it is 
especially the basis of discriminatory action when treating so-called 
groups of people, such as ethnic minorities, women, and young 
people (Fowler 1991: 84). Categorizing as an ideological operation 
entails techniques such as simplification and impersonalization.
2.1. Simplification: The Collective as a Single Cohesive Entity
In the ideological strategy, people and institutions are
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conceived of as a collective entity, as though there is a complete 
identification of views and interests among all members of the 
collective entity. This strategy ignores individual features and ideas 
as complicated variables. Such simplification in categorization 
becomes stronger in proportion to the need for mobilizing people. 
Wartime is the extreme case. Categorization is based on a 
dichotomizing technique of constructing two camps: us and them (the 
enemy). In the Japanese press during World 'War II, the rivalry, or 
binary, relation was expressed in terms of a dichotomy between 
"Asia" and "Anglo-America". The rhetoric of justification was that 
Japan was fighting for the liberation of Asia from Anglo-American 
colonialism. Such categorization simplifies the war into a conflict 
between Asia and Anglo-America. This generic reference to Asians 
assumes that the interests of the whole of Asia are unified and held in 
common, and that all the people living in Asia recognize this "fact" 
by agreeing to a certain set of political ideas (Hartley 1982: 81-83). 
Thus in the Japanese press a quite simplified categorization was 
being deployed.
2.2. Impersonalization and Depersonalization
    In connection with simplification, a form of impersonalization 
(or even depersonalization) is also predominant in the way a wartime 
press will represent a people. Labeled a member of a collective 
agent, a person loses his or her individuality and originality and 
becomes part of an aggregate of people. For example, in Japan 
people were conceived of as shinmin (subjects of the emperor) as laid 
down in the Meiji Constitution (the Great Japan Imperial 
Constitution). In a similar manner, the constant plurals used with 
reference to groups effaced individuality: Asians, liberators, enemies, 
aggressors, brutal Americans, etc. People and objects are encoded in 
highly abstract, emotive, and impersonalized words. In this way 
there is a dehumanizing transformation of the human individual into
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a depersonalized collective entity. This is a kind of substitution 
process by which "a certain kind of individual can be replaced by 
nouns referring to larger abstract entities" (Fowler et al. 1979: 162). 
Such impersonalized nomenclature leads to depersonalization and 
facilitates governmental control of people in a subtle way. An 
impersonal style is accepted as normal in official discourse; its mood 
is institutional rather than personal. Categorizing functions to 
reinforce that official attitude of dealing with people not as 
individuals, but as anonymous entities; it emphasizes the roles that a 
collective entity is expected to play. This is because this device of 
labeling has the psychological effect of "relating a class of agents to a 
class of actions" (Fowler et al. 1979: 163) or roles that they are 
expected to perform. Here are two examples (bold emphasis 
added).
(1) "A revolution which concerns not only our armies and 
   governments, but every single person in East Asia. It is 
   everybody's revolution, and the revolutionary front is in every
   home and every town." 
                       (Nippon Times, 20 November 1944)
(2) "...a new stage where the manifest will of a billion Asiatic 
   people has become articulate by translating itself into a 
   positive joint enterprise." 
(Nippon Times, 19 June 1943)
    The use of generic quantifiers, such as every (single person) or 
all (the people), has the effect of strengthening this device of 
collectivization. The citations from Nippon Times contain several 
examples of such collectivization. (See also extracts in section 2.3.)
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 2.3. Solidarity through an Ideology of Consensus
    Forming solidarity among the people in the nation is essential 
in waging a war. War leaders try to form a spirit of solidarity by 
invoking consensus. Articulating an ideology of consensus is a 
crucial step for exercising mind control. The idea of consensus has 
been explored and developed by Hall (1973), Hartley (1982), and 
others, along with a notion of a "consensual" view of society. 
Consensus presumes that, for a certain grouping of people, the 
interests of the whole population totally agree. Consensus assumes 
homogeneous systems of interests, beliefs, and experience in 
communities. 
    The language device aimed at solidarity that was adopted by 
war leaders in Japan during World War II s:poke of two different 
manifestations of solidarity. First there was the solidarity of Asian 
countries with Japan in the fight against Western Powers and against 
the communists (China had not yet been taken over by the 
communists). Secondly, there was the solidarity among the Japanese 
people in the fight against the Western Powers and communism. 
The concept of a "consensual view of society" is, however, 
misleading; it is an ideological device employed in order to 
manipulate public opinion. The extracts that will soon follow below 
demonstrate that solidarity through creating consensus is simply a 
linguistic device for control.
    Many complex economic and demographic facts could be 
brought forth to disprove the existence of real consensus. For 
example, there were (and still are) regional and class differences 
among Asians and within Japan, as well as in the relationship 
between Japan and the individual countries of Asia. The interests of 
Japan and other Asian countries, or the interest of Japanese leaders 
and the Japanese people, did not (and still do not) necessarily 




 coinci de, as we see in the examples below (bold emphasis
(3) "the joint defence against communism" 
   (Lieutenant-General Ando, in The Japan Times & Advertiser, 
                              1 December1941)
(4) "The joint communique pledged the iron solidarity of the 
   nation for coping with the prevailing war situations" 
(The japan Times &Advertiser, 9 December 1941)
(5) "establis h a new order for its common prosperity" 
(The Japan Times &Advertiser, 7 December 1941)
(6) "The Total War Consciousness of the Japanese Nation" 
                    (Nippon Times, 5 September1943)
(7) "Co-operation means co-prosperity" 
                        (Nippon Times, 3 September 1943)
(8) "Asia's billion rally under Banner of Pan-orientalism" 
(Nippon Times, 9September 1943)
(9) "The one billion people of East Asia have risen as one man to 
   fight for self-existence and self-defense" 
                       (Nippon Times, 27 November 1944)
    If we admit that language has the function of influencing 
existing social structures, whether by reinforcing or by changing 
them, then these expressions would have had the effect of bringing 
together the minds of all Asian people. This is why the unity of goal, 
effect, and interests of all Asian people on the one hand, and of all 
Japanese people on the other hand (including the leaders and the
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people), is repeatedly implied in terms like cooperation, common 
prosperity  (co  prosperity), joint defence, total war consciousness, etc., terms 
that express interests and values they are supposed to share in their 
lives.
3. Dichotomizing: Ideological Construction of Them and Us 
    Dichotomizing refers to distinguishing the group that one 
belongs to from another group that opposes the group; this practice 
of polarization is often used in war rhetoric to strengthen the 
solidarity of the group one belongs to. 
3.1. Labeling 
    One of the most effective ways of dichotomizing in wartime 
rhetoric is labeling with words that have either positive or negative 
images. Such words as cooperation, victory, freedom, right, justice, and 
co prosperity express interests and experience that we share in our 
lives. These are values that are based on an ideological assumption 
that is conceived to be legitimate in terms of abstract systems of 
societal values (Fowler 1991: 51). 
    Steve Chibnall (citedin Fowler 1991: 52) drew up a list of 
some of the positive, legitimating values and negative, illegitimate 
values assumed in society. The following is a portion of his list. 
  Positive, legitimating values Negative, illegitimate values 
   orderchaos 
       cooperationconfrontation 
      fairnessunfairness 
         constructivenessdestructiveness 
          freedom of choicemonopoly / uniformity 
      equalityinequality
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    This practice of dichotomizing through abstract vocabulary is a 
basis for the ideological construction of them and us. The positive 
column exhibits interests, values, and experiences that we share in 
our lives, and that are socially and culturally desirable qualities. In 
the ideological construction of an enemy, they are associated with the 
negative lexicon in the right-hand column. The rhetoric goes that 
these values of us are threatened by them. In the discussion of the 
construction of an enemy, they are treated as "the agents of predicates 
designating brutal actions" (Fowler 1991: 138). We are patients 
(those who are affected by the acts of an agent), or victims, of these 
agents. The government "must protect people" (or we must protect 
ourselves) against his brutality and certain categories of violent 
behavior. This sort of structural opposition can be explicitly seen in 
Chibnall's examples, in which the vocabulary dichotomizes nations 
or political organizations into two spheres or groups, and implies a 
"struggle" between them. As an old saying has it, almost every war 
starts with the cause of self-defense in the name of justice; the 
rhetoric is that we are, in the first place, patients threatened by them, 
who are agents of violent behavior. Now, we have no other choice 
but to become an agent of "a sacred war in defence of justice"  (Nippon 
Times, 5 September 1943). As is obvious by now, categorization by 
vocabulary is an integral part of the production of ideology in the 
newspapers (Fowler 1991: 84). 
    If we apply Steve Chibnall's classification, it can be said that 
words and phrases with positive legitimating values were used by the 
Japanese press during the war period to refer to Japan's position, 
status, and political goals from Japan's own perspective, while words 
with negative, illegitimate values were used in regard to those of the 
Americans and Britons. Dichotomization through vocabulary can be 
readily found in statements appearing in the newspapers (Japan 
Times & Advertiser and Nippon Times) during the war.
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  Positive, legitimating values Negative, illegitimate values 
  freedomtyranny, totalitarianism 
  justicedepredation, oligarchy 
 liberatoroppressor 
  unselfish acrificemonopolization of the world 
   war to save democracy betrayer of democracy
   territorial integrity alien-capitalist imperialism 
  holy missionexploitative policies 
  sovereigntydomination 
3.2. The Use of Abstract Vocabulary 
    It is interesting to notethat a semantic analysis of an abstract 
system of values sheds much light on the analysis of the 
dichotomizing effect of politicized language. Lyons (1977: 442-445) 
classified words into three categories, according to their degree of 
abstractness in meaning, as follows: 
1st-order entity: discrete physical objects that are publicly 
     observable (e.g., persons, animals, things) 
2nd-order entity: abstract entities that are located in time and 
     space (e.g., states of affairs, events, processes) 
3rd-order entity: abstract entities (such as propositions) that are 
     outside space and time. They function to express reasons, 
     beliefs, assertions, judgements, or expectations. For example, 
    "I believe he is right" or "I expect the experiment to be 
     successful." 
    We find that modes of expression referring to either side in 
dichotomizing practice (them and us) are 2nd-order entities (freedom, 
justice, alien-capitalist imperialism). There seems to be two reasons for
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this linguistic distinction. Firstly, the enemy is often invisible to most 
people, as happened in Japan during World War II, since there was 
no direct contact between ordinary Japanese citizens and the people 
in other countries where Japanese troops were fighting at that time. 
So it was impossible for those "back home" to get worked up about a 
foreign enemy on the basis of concrete modes of expression referring 
to  1st-order entities. Information contributing to the formation of a 
concrete idea (represented by 1st-order entities) was concealed by 
Japan's military leaders as part of their manipulation of information 
for obfuscation purposes (i.e., disinformation as it came to be called 
later). Secondly, the use of 2"-order entities helps to fabricate a 
biased image of the enemy, thus aiding the use of language for 
propaganda. "To spiritualize a material issue" (Burke 1984: 77) is a 
process of propagandization.
303. The Use of Plural Personal Pronouns: We and They
    As a grammatical device for dichotomizing, the frequent use of 
plural personal pronouns, we, our, and us versus they, their, and them 
promotes a sense of consensual ideology. The first-person plural 
pronouns we, our, and us are used in an exclusive sense 
(presupposing the existence of the enemy outside), but more 
frequently in the inclusive sense (referring to effects in the 
community such as shock or pathos, as these are caused by the 
enemy). This leads to the rhetoric "We have no other choice but to 
unite." Both the exclusive and the inclusive functions reflect national 
and political ideology. The third-person plural pronouns they, their, 
and them (the people represented by the they pronouns threaten the 
lawful and humane existence of the people represented by we) have 
dichotomizing functions and also contribute to strengthen solidarity. 
    Like the plural personal pronouns we and they, plural noun 
forms such as Asians and shinmin (subjects of the emperor as laid 
down in the Meiji Constitution) also have the effect of
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collectivization. Finally, the use of plural forms for the addressee 
suggests the addresser's refusal to handle the addressee as an 
individual person and only as an impersonalized object. 
4. Construction of an Enemy 
    When pursuing a political objective, people in their human 
infirmity again require an enemy. If a movement must have its goal, 
it must also have its devil or common enemy at which the battle is 
targeted, as a unification device. 
4.1. Collectivization of an Enemy 
    People can unite best on the basis of an enemy shared by all 
the people, as Hitler maintained in his book Mein Kampf (My Battle) 
(translated and cited in Burke 1984: 62-63; bold emphasis added): 
    As a whole, and at all times the efficiency of the truly national 
    leader consists primarily in preventing the division of the 
    attention of a people, and always in concentrating it on a 
    single enemy. The more uniformly the fighting will of a
    people is put into action, the greater will be the magnetic force 
    of the movement and the more powerful the impetus of the 
    blow. It is part of the genius of a great leader to make 
    adversaries of different fields appear as always 
    belonging to one category only. 
    Constructing an enemy is "the projective device of the 
scapegoat" (Burke 1984: 69). It is a curative process that comes with 
the device to shift one's ills to a scapegoat.
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4.2. Impersonali.zation of an Enemy
    Collectivization of an enemy (or the device of making enemies 
look like one) goes together with their impersonalization or even 
dehumanization, as well as simplification. What is important to note 
is that a large part of the population at the grassroot level does not 
perceive them ("the Western aggressors") a  enemies at all. In order 
to make "the Western aggressors" seem like the enemy to the people, 
and to intensify the fears and anger of the people, enemy forces must 
be categorized as evil creatures (possibly using animal images) and 
their perceptible human characteristics must be disregarded so as to 
justify extermination of the enemy (Edelman 1977: 34). Thus 
collectivization e tails implification and pluralization as well. 
    Enemies must be given labels that "highlight the covert, 
inhuman, incalculable qualities that make it impossible to deal with 
them as fellow human beings." Examples of such labels are devil, 
ruthless exploiter, communist conspirators (Edelman 1977: 35). Here, 
relexicalization (rewording) is called for to label an enemy. The 
enemy must bear labels along with negative, emotive, violent, and 
abstract expressions that are not given a clear-cut definition in order 
to create an image of an "inhuman and uncanny" being (ibid.). 
Evaluative adverbs and adjectives, as opposed to objective usage, are 
prominent, e.g., brutally, ruthless, evil, fanatically, diabolical, hideous, 
mercilessly, etc. Wartime leaders and the press tend to conceal 
objective and well-balanced information concerning the enemy; if 
they are to be successful in arousing hatred of the enemy through 
labeling them as inhuman and creating an image of the enemy as a 
mythical being, the universal humanistic nature of the enemy should 
not be made known. It is important that those unseen enemies be 
known and perceived only through abstract names and other verbal 
signs. 
    Here in Japan, for example, American and British people were 
portrayed as beasts by labeling them kichiku-beiei (brutal Americans
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and Britons) to inflame people's hatred of them. In the wartime 
press, only the negative and inhuman aspects of the enemy were 
reported, using the  2"d-order-entity words of Lyons's classification, 
which also have negative, emotive, and violent connotations. 
5. The Polarization of the World: The Rhetoric of the "War 
   on Terrorism"
    The linguistic devices of dichotomizing and collectivizing, or 
the ideological creation of us and them, are not just things that 
occurred six decades ago. They are fundamental techniques present 
in any war rhetoric — even today. In the wake of the September 
1 ith terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, the U.S. started 
preparing for an all-out assault against errorism and called for the 
rest of the world to rally to the cause. There was a heightened sense 
of patriotism, and a slogan that indicated a shared commitment: 
"United We Stand." President George W. Bush addressed a joint 
session of Congress and the American people on 20 September 2001 
-- an event attended by the British Prime Minister, Tony Blair — in 
the following terms: 
    Every nation, in every region, now has a decision to make. 
    Either you are with us, or you are with the terrorists. 
    (Applause.) From this day forward, any nation that continues 
    to harbor or support terrorism will be regarded by the United 
    States as a hostile regime. 
--- George W. Bush, to a joint session of Congress, 
                                  20 September 2001 
    In a similar way, just after the U.S. and British forces launched 
a military assault on Afghanistan's Taliban regime on 7 October 
2001, Bush said in a televised speech to the nation from the White 
House Treaty Room:
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Today, we focus on Afghanistan, but the battle is broad. Every 
nation has a choice to make in this battle. There is no neutral 
ground. (cited in  The  Japan Times, 9October 2001)
    In this rhetoric of the president, a clear-cut dichotomization is 
explicitly found, particularly when he says, "there is no neutral 
ground." It is a powerful and effective device in war rhetoric not to 
allow a "gray zone." From a semantic viewpoint, the choice "either 
with us or against us" does not strictly constitute binary opposites. 
The choice is not logical or realistic because the indeterminacy that 
exists between them is disregarded. Binary opposites represent a 
relationship of complementarity, such as the relationship between 
"animate" or "inanimate," or between "male" or "female" (Palmer 
1981: 111). So if it is asked whether a certain accident victim is 
"dead or alive
," the question is logical and realistic because there is 
complementarity between being dead and alive. But there is not 
such complementarity between enemy and allies. In reality, the world 
represents diversity, and the majority of the world population is 
neither U.S. citizens nor terrorists. In addition, even among the 
allies of the U.S., the methods and degrees of support (combat, 
intelligence, financial, and diplomatic) varied. Support was given 
not just in logistics or military action but also in nonmilitary ways, 
such as providing reconstruction assistance for war-torn Afghanistan, 
interrupting the channels of terrorist financing, controlling the 
refugee population, or sharing intelligence. However, global 
diversity is better ignored in war rhetoric, and simplification and 
collectivization have to be given emphasis. Therefore, the phrase 
that presented a choice "either with us or against us," which is based 
on polarization of the world, is part of a convincing war rhetoric 
even if it is illogical and unrealistic. The same dichotomizing device 
is widely used by leaders of other nations involved in war or 
conflicts. It was also taken up by the U.S.'s other enemy, Iraq's 
president Saddam Hussein. In the summer of 2002, faced with a
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possible U.S. attack on his country, Saddam Hussein said, "those 
who support the U.S. government are all devils." 
    As happened in wartime discourse during the Second World 
War, dichotomizing is reinforced by the use of abstract, emotive 
vocabulary. Steve Chibnall's classification is applicable here again; 
words and phrases with positive, legitimating values were adopted 
by the American press to refer to their position, status, and political 
goals, e.g. freedom, justice, peace, tc. On the other hand, words and 
phrases with negative, illegitimate values are naturally used to refer 
to those of terrorists, e.g. violence, fear, totalitarianism, cruelty, 
murderous, tyranny, etc. The following examples are extracts from 
Bush's speech made at that 20 September joint session of Congress 
entitled "Freedom at war with fear."
On September the  11th, enemies of freedom committed an act 
of war against our country ... night fell on a different world, a 
world where freedom itself is under attack.
Tonight we are a country awakened to danger and called to 
defend freedom. Our grief has turned to anger, and anger to 
resolution. Whether we bring our enemies to justice, or bring 
justice to our enemies, justice will be done. (Applause.) 
They are the heirs of all the murderous ideologies of the 20th 
century ... they follow in the path of fascism , and Nazism, and 
totalitarianism.
Freedom and fear are at war... Our nation --- this generation 
  will lift a dark threat of violence from our people and our 
future. We will rally the world to this cause by our efforts , by 
our courage.
Freedom and fear, justice and cruelty, have always been at
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war, and we know that God is not neutral between them. 
(Applause.)
    The rhetoric emphasizes societal values uch as freedom, justice, 
peace, courage, and democracy that are held to be universal principles 
applicable to any people at any time. The rhetoric has universal 
elements that have been the basis of speeches made by successive 
American presidents over the centuries. Rather than presenting the 
masses with specific casualty figures or a specific policy, such 
rhetoric, by emphasizing these universal values, is more effective in 
mobilizing the masses into unity. As previously mentioned, the role 
of wartime rhetoric is to "spiritualize the material." However, in the 
course of history the nature of war has changed into something that 
exhibits more complexity. In World War II, the clash was between 
nations, and they faced discrete known enemies. But today the 
question is not that simple, and this results in a situation in which the 
clash or dichotomization can even be misused or misunderstood. 
Some misinterpret i as a clash between the Muslim and the free 
Western world. In response to the U.S.-and-British-led counterattack 
on Afghanistan, Taliban envoy Abdal Salan Zaeet, speaking at a 
news conference inIslamabad, the Pakistani capital, said:
The U.S.-led attacks were a "terrorist" assault on the whole 
Islamic world. This action is not only against the "Islamic 
Emirate of Afghanistan," but this is a terrorist attack on the 
whole Muslim world. 
               (cited in The Japan Times, 9 October 2001)
    The misinterpreted dichotomization also had tragic 
consequences: the TV images of Palestinians celebrating the attacks 
on the Twin Towers inflamed anger against even uncommitted Arab 
Americans in the U.S. Bush rejects this dichotomization in his 20 
September speech in the following terms:
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The terrorists practice a fringe form of Islamic extremism that 
has been rejected by Muslim scholars and the vast majority of 
Muslim clerics a fringe movement hat perverts the peaceful 
teachings of Islam....
I also want to speak tonight directly to Muslims throughout the 
world. We respect your faith... Its teachings are good and 
peaceful, and those who commit evil in the name of Allah 
blaspheme the name of Allah. (Applause.) The terrorists are 
traitors to their own faith, trying, in effect., to hijack Islam itself. 
The enemy of America is not our many Muslim friends; it is 
not our many Arab friends. Our enemy is a radical network of 
terrorists, and every government that supports them. 
(Applause.)
    The American president, who had adopted dichotomization in 
his own speech rhetoric, was quite aware of the dangers as well as 
advantages inherent in dichotomization, and thus implicitly warned 
against it to protect innocent Arab Americans.
6. Conclusion
    This paper has tried to show how linguistic resources in war 
discourse are used as a unification device by categorizing, labeling, 
dichotomizing, abstracting, and impersonalizing. For the main area 
of data analysis, Japanese newspapers written in English during the 
Second World War were used. These linguistic devices are, 
nevertheless, not simply ancient techniques employed sixty years 
ago. They are still alive and extensively adopted in the war rhetoric 
of the present day. To corroborate the universality of some features 
of wartime register, both spoken and written media discourse 
employed by leaders in the U.S., Afghanistan, and Iraq was used as a 
secondary area for analysis.
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    After the September  11  th terrorist attacks, the greater fear and 
insecurity felt by the people increased the power of the government. 
Nussbaum (2002: 38) says, "Post-September 11, the government's 
size, reach, and authority expanded sharply. It grew as a 
consequence of protecting U.S. citizens not only from terrorists from 
across the seas but also from unethical CEOs (chief executive 
officers)." Language clearly reflects ocietal and political conditions 
and changes of the time. A strong form of wartime register emerges 
when a nation is at risk and desires a stronger government. A 
prominent historian, Arthur Schlesinger, J ., says in his 1986 book 
Cycles of American History, "the pendulum has swung back and forth 
approximately every 20 to 30 years between laissez-faire and greater 
government" (discussed by Nussbaum 2002: 38). If this is so, now is 
one of those times when people are calling for more government 
functions to secure their lives. This is reflected in President Bush's 
televised speech in October 2002; "America is united. America is 
strong. America will remain strong." In the midst of the Cold War 
in the 1980s, the Reagan administration called the Soviet Union of 
that time an "Evil Empire", which obviously reflects a propagandistic 
use of language. During the period from the end of the Cold War to 
11 September 2001, U.S. foreign policy was centered almost 
exclusively on business and trade. In this period, the extreme form 
of political propaganda we have discussed above was not found. 
Thus, the existence of a war register is clearly confirmed in a context 
of war or war-like situations, where a strong form of government or a 
strong nation is in urgent demand. 
    Finally, it is important to mention that there is a much wider 
variety of language usage and speech acts that affect people's thought 
and behavior, or that enforce control through language, than what 
was discussed above. Examples are modality, temporal 
manipulation, and repetitious usage of certain language phrases, to 
mention a few. What I have discussed in this paper are just some 
functions among the many extensive means of wartime rhetoric that
Media Discourse of War 183
deserve further investigation.
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